Six-party Talks
Evening Walkthrough With Reporters at the Six-Party Talks
Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
St. Regis Hotel
Beijing, China
February 13, 2007
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Hi, good evening. Well I’m glad we could do this early, because I’ve been worried whether you’re getting enough sleep. As you all know, we reached agreement. It’s agreement on initial actions. Obviously we have a long way to go, but we’re very pleased with this agreement. We feel it’s a very, very solid step forward. The agreement really is the first implementation of the September ’05 statement. As such, it’s very important -- because we’re moving off the pages of the September statement and onto the ground and real implementation. I think many of you have had a chance to see the text by now. But the first undertaking, of course, is the shut-down and sealing of the Yongbyon five megawatt reactor and nuclear complex in Yongbyon and the return of IAEA inspectors.
In addition, the DPRK will begin to discuss the full list of nuclear programs that are to be abandoned pursuant to the agreement. In addition, we have all agreed to begin the working groups. Of the five working groups, I think the two that are, of course, of great interest to us are the U.S.-DPRK working group to begin the long road to normalization -- to begin that process -- and also the DPRK-Japan working group. These two bilateral working groups will begin within 30 days of today’s agreement. In addition, of course, there will be working groups on denuclearization and also working groups on economic and energy assistance for the DPRK.
There is of course more in the agreement. The agreement involves providing an initial shipment of heavy fuel oil to the DPRK – an initial shipment of 50,000 tons. And then the agreement envisions additional shipments to total one million tons. Those additional shipments will come in a second phase, a phase that will involve the disabling of all of the nuclear facilities of the DPRK. Plus that phase involves the submission of the comprehensive, of the complete list – complete declaration of nuclear programs and of programs to be abandoned according to the September statement.
What this agreement does is, we have an initial set of actions and then we have a peek into the next phase, which will involve the disabling of these facilitates. We have a lot of work to do. It’s certainly not the end of the process. It’s really just the end of the beginning of the process, but I think we’re all very encouraged.
I’d like also to say that it was encouraging to me the degree to which all six delegations were able to work together through these very difficult days. We are so appreciative of the efforts of the Chinese. Certainly, the Chinese worked very hard to keep everybody on task and to really close the deal. They kept us up very late, deprived us of some necessary sleep. I’m sure there’s some international covenant against that, but nonetheless we appreciated their sticking to the job and getting it done. I think it was, in addition to being a very good day for the Six-Party process, it was also a very good day for the U.S.-China relationship.
So, with those kinds of opening comments maybe I can take some of your questions.
QUESTION: Can you give us some additional insight into what was happening behind the scenes? What were some of the final sticking points, and how did you overcome them?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: As I suggested to you, the main sticking point was energy. In Berlin we had envisioned that the energy would involve the start of energy assistance during the sixty day period during which these actions are supposed to take place. So we envision that during this sixty day period there would be a working group on energy and an agreement on how much assistance there would be, with the start of that assistance to come before the end of the sixty days. But as we spent the last five days, it was clear that the DPRK was interested in getting an overall figure -- not to a working group, but rather through a Six-Party plenary process. We tried very hard to convince the DPRK to push this issue to the working group, but ultimately the DPRK felt they needed a number out of this Six-Party meeting. As we looked at that, we thought that perhaps we could work with a bigger number but do it in the context of identifying the next phase. We saw the potential of not just having an addendum to the initial actions, but rather a section that would show where we’re heading in the next phase and how much fuel assistance there would be involved in that.
Of course, the working group on energy will have a lot of work to do to determine how that one million tons of fuel oil is finally allocated, what the rates of allocation are -- because it needs to be done probably on a regular basis. And then the working group will have to sequence some of the actions. But we’re pleased that through this fuel oil issue, we’ve been able to identify the next phase beyond just the shut down and sealing, but the next phase to actual disabling.
Obviously [there's] a lot more work to be done there. But we took what was essentially a sticking point and used it as a way to make further progress on the road to final denuclearization. I cannot emphasize enough – and I think I’ve emphasized several times – the fact that we’re not interested in a freeze. We’re interested in denuclearization. And I know that some people say that, "Isn’t shutting down a reactor a freeze?" Well, we didn’t think that you could disable and finally dismantle and abandon a reactor unless you first shut it down. We thought that’s a logical first step and therefore logically included in the initial action.
QUESTION: Ambassador Hill, Ambassador Bolton said that [inaudible] criticized the United States...
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’m sorry, who criticized it?
QUESTION: Ambassador Bolton.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, John Bolton. Oh look, he’s a private citizen. He certainly has a right to his opinions. I’m sure he’s not the only person that will criticize it. There will be those who criticize it as not being tough enough or something. There will be others who criticize it as being overdue or something. Look, I can handle criticism, that’s life.
QUESTION: Do you think it will encourage Iran to [inaudible]?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I don’t work on Iran, but I will tell you that denuclearization is the way to go, that weapons of mass destruction do nothing for these countries. I would argue that the DPRK’s investment in these programs has been a very bad investment, and the nuclear programs of the DPRK have been programs that have really helped impoverish that country. They do not buy prestige; they do not buy influence. Frankly, they buy a lot of isolation. I hope that if our little initial actions here can inspire some other countries to move on that course I would be very, very pleased indeed.
QUESTION: Ambassador Hill, can you identify for us the heads of the American working groups? Where are they going to meet and when is that going to start?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think we are committed to beginning all the working groups within thirty days. We will, of course, in the bilateral working groups, we will be a co-chair. I don’t think we have worked out the heads of the working groups quite yet. We obviously have to do that. We did have a discussion on that matter, but I think we can work that out very collegially. We began some discussion on that, and that will not pose any kind of problem. I think each working group, too, will have to determine at what level it will meet. For example, energy might not be at a deputy minister level; it might be at a more technical level. I just don’t know at this point. We will work that out, because I think that everybody understands the commitments involved.
QUESTION: Ambassador Hill, does this give the IAEA enough authority? It says the DPRK has to agree with the verification measures.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The IAEA will have its standards of going in and performing its obligations, and I think the DPRK will have to accept how they do that. I’m sure some issues will come up there, but I’m sure that they’ll be able to resolve them.
QUESTION: If everything goes as well as you might hope, how long would it take before the Korean Peninsula is denuclearized?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Things often don’t go as well as you want them to, although I’d rather focus on some good news today. We do have a process in mind that moves fairly quickly. These initial actions are being done in sixty days. That’s going to be very fast paced. I can’t tell you precisely how that next phase will work, although we’re talking about fuel oil that the DPRK estimates is a one year supply. The sooner we get these actions done, the sooner they get their fuel. We would really like to move quickly, and our hope is that as the initial actions proceed we can build up some momentum and get through this more quickly. But I don’t have an overall date to share with you.
QUESTION: Ambassador Hill, how about the fissionable materials from Yongbyon? How are you going to get a hold of those and get rid of those?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The fissile material, the plutonium -- which is estimated, depending on who you listen to, say fifty kilos or something like that -- they would be able to work that out with much greater precision when they look more closely at the reactor. Obviously those have to be part of the DPRK’s complete declaration. We would look forward to a discussion about that in this initial phase.
Clearly, as part of denuclearization, that fissile material needs to be brought under international control. We anticipate that being the case. Certainly, initial actions need to be understood as initial. Just stopping the further production of plutonium doesn’t end the problem, because there’s already plutonium that’s been produced. But given that plutonium is a substance that once it’s produced has a way of staying on this earth for some seven hundred thousand years –at least that’s the estimated half life – we thought it was valuable to try to prevent more it from being produced. Clearly, this is only an initial phase. And we do need to get to a complete declaration, and that includes the plutonium already produced. And then, finally, that also needs to be put under international control.
QUESTION: When do you see that happening?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We’re working on some initial steps. We have a glimpse into what the next phase will be, and we’ll be developing timelines as soon as we can do that. This is a negotiated process, and we’ll just have to continue to work. But we’re not going to rest until we complete the job.
QUESTION: Does all of this unravel if they don’t declare a uranium-enrichment program?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’ve had considerable discussions with them on this point. We have to get a mutual satisfactory outcome on this. We need to know precisely what is involved. We don’t have an agreement on, at this point, on even the existence of this program. I certainly have made very clear repeatedly that we need to ensure that we know precisely the status of that. I would anticipate that, as part of the denuclearization working group, that we would have a sub-working group to deal with this issue. It does need to be addressed.
QUESTION: Are you taking out North Korea from the Axis of Evil?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Come on. Look, I’m just a simple diplomat. I’m just trying to deal with a problem here.
QUESTION: People who negotiated the agreement back in the 90’s, it wasn’t their final goal to end at a nuclear freeze. What a lot of people are now saying is that you have a freeze with the promise of disarmament, and that’s where they were, and they were planning to go to that as well. How’s is this different, looking back into the 90s? What you did today, how is this different?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: First of all, the agreement in the 1990s, the Agreed Framework was a different era. And it was addressing some tough problems. You recall in 1994 there was a concern about war at that point. It’s not for me to criticize past efforts. I very much respect the people that were involved in that process.
What we have tried to do in this process is, first of all, make it a multilateral process. That’s based on the, I think, sound principle that this is not a United States problem. This is a problem for everybody, and it’s especially a problem for the DPRK’s neighbors. The first difference, I think, is to make this really a multilateral effort. I feel satisfied that we’re doing that, because every delegation has been very, very active participants in working these issues through. I hesitate to mention one delegation, because then we’ll have to go through all of the delegations. But certainly that ROK delegation with Chun Yung-woo at the head of it, very active, worked very hard, knew very much the whole energy situation, the heavy fuel oil situation. We worked very closely with the Japanese throughout, under Ken Sasae, and their efforts to address some of their very urgent concerns that are very much felt in the Japanese public. I was pleased they were able to have a first bilateral meeting with the DPRK. And I’m very pleased that they’re at the bilateral process, with the DPRK and Japan going to be one of our working groups and going to be undertaken within the first thirty days.
I guess what I am getting at is, one thing we are doing in the Six Party process is we are going beyond the denuclearization agreement. We are certainly going beyond an energy agreement. And what we are really trying to do is to address some of the underlying causes of tensions in the region. I think that Northeast Asia is a region not unlike some other regions of the world that’s very much burdened by its history. And we are trying to address some of those problems that have caused so many great difficulties between states here.
So I would say it’s a very comprehensive effort. And you will note that one thing we are going to try to do at the end of the sixty day period—this is in the agreement—is bring all the ministers together to have a Six Party ministerial to chart the way forward. We are interested in moving from this ministerial to address the additional steps in denuclearization. But also what we would hope to do is create a mechanism among the appropriate parties for addressing the peace process.
To understand this process differently from the 1990’s, it is the different era. But certainly what we are trying to do is address comprehensively and bring all these other partners as equal partners to the table. I feel that we are doing that. I can’t tell you that this is all going to succeed, but I can tell you that everyone is working very hard to try to make it work.
Again, China’s role in this – to see China and the U.S. working together the way we are, I think that would have been a little surprising a few years ago if you’d predicted this. So, it’s a different approach. And I hate to compare it to previous approaches, because I have such great respect for the people who were involved with that as well.
QUESTION: Can I have just one follow up? On the working groups, there are some concerns. It says in there that one working [group] doesn’t have to progress as the other working groups do. There are some concerns among the Japanese that they maybe the one that falls behind. How do you envision that the working groups move forward together rather than one falling behind?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: What we wanted to address was that we didn’t want to create a situation where you have these five simultaneous working groups, and then you start looking within each working groups to see how much each working group is doing in terms of its own plan and then try to harmonize the work plans through five different working groups. We are saying to each working group, “You have certain activities you are pursuing. Pursue them and don’t try to measure whether you are working faster than another group.” I think the fact that they’ve all been (inaudible) and the fact that all the parties have committed to putting those working groups into action within thirty days suggests that everyone wants to make progress.
And with respect to the issue of the Japan-DPRK working group, I’ve had many discussions on this and many discussions with the DPRK delegation. I think for the DPRK, it does need to find a way to deal with this neighbor who is also the world’s second largest economy. I think it is very much in the DPRK’s interest to meet the Japanese and to begin a process to address these problems that have been so well identified.
QUESTION: Why does North Korea now merit discussion about being taken off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and was the policy to begin with the in need of being fixed?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We are going to begin that process and go through that. Some of it is a legal process; some of it is a political process. We are going to go through it. I am not going to put prejudice on the outcome at this point, but we are committed to working through this with a goal of getting them out. But we will need to sit down. And like all these working groups, it will be an interactive process.
QUESTION: Do you have procedures to solve the financial sanctions?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: The United States is committed, and we’ve told the Chinese chair and we told the other participants that we will resolve the matter of the financial sanctions pertaining to BDA within thirty days. We have some ideas of how to proceed with that. There have been a lot of discussions on that, and a part of what we did today was to say that we will resolve this within thirty days.
QUESTION: Can you please tell us from where and when is going to depart the first oil shipment to North Korea?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: If you look at the agreement, we are committed at the end of the first sixty days period to make the first shipment of 50,000 tons of fuel oil. Prior to that, there will be a meeting of the energy working groups, and they will work out modalities of that shipment and other shipments in this follow on phase. I can’t tell you where it will come from and where it will got to.
I will tell you that we agreed with other parties to share the burden of the economic, humanitarian and energy assistance – emergency assistance. We agreed to share that burden on a equitable basis. Four countries, Russia, China, the U.S. and ROK, agreed to do that. We welcome the participation of Japan to join this, subject to Japan resolving its outstanding issues. And we also welcome participation of the international community, because we do believe that there will be other countries that want to join in this process.
There is no question that the DPRK needs energy. I would argue that they’ve made a terrible mistake focusing on this nuclear weapons program. I think they made a terrible mistake abusing civil nuclear energy in the way did and diverting it to military use. That is why we are addressing that. But we also have compassion for the people there who do need fuel oil, who need humanitarian and economic assistance. And in the context of denuclearization, we want to begin to help.
QUESTION: Mr. Ambassador, the U.S. Government used to say that the U.S. Government will not remove North Korea out of the list of state terrorists until the abduction issue is resolved.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: We are in close contact with the Japanese Government on this issue and on other issues involving our mutual interests. What we have committed to do is to begin a working group aimed at normalization and that this normalization would involve also removing the DPRK from this list of state sponsors of terrorism. The final step in this process is down the road, but certainly we are in very close communication and cooperation with the Japanese Government on this.
QUESTION: Ambassador Hill…
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes, but let me get this gentleman behind you and I will come back to you.
QUESTION: Back to the question of verification. The document refers to inspectors being able to conduct all necessary monitoring as agreed. “Necessary” and “agree” suggest another round of negotiation. Don’t you feel any confidence that you are going to have access to ensure that you are getting all the information, in particular, the [inaudible] issue?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I said we had some very detailed conversations on that. Some of the details that you refer to are ones that will rest in the working groups. We believe that we can achieve that, based on our understandings here. This agreement we have is, I think, a four-page agreement. We are not in a position at this point to go through all the details of that, except to say that we have mechanisms for these working groups. And certainly we have been in considerable consultations, including with the IAEA, already. We are hopeful that we will not encounter these impediments. And when we do, we will figure out how to deal with them.
QUESTION: Just to follow up on the HEU, have the North Koreans confirmed that they have a program?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No. But what they said is they are prepared to sit with us and discuss that and reach mutually satisfactory conclusions. But no, they have not confirmed that they have such a program.
QUESTION: Do you think the North Koreans have made a strategic decision?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Strategic decision? Oh, you know, I guess the easy answer is you should ask them. I think they made a strategic decision to move from where they were and to definitely begin a process to take them to another place. I have no doubt that this nuclear program has been extremely costly to that country, and it’s my fervent hope that people of the DPRK understand that as well. But certainly I think we can take from this set of initial steps, initial actions, an understanding from the DPRK that they had to move from the position that they were in. And how far they are willing to move and at what pace, time will tell.
QUESTION: Is the DPRK required to identify how many nuclear weapons they have?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Oh, absolutely. This initial stage involves discussing a list of their nuclear programs to be abandoned, and that would include the plutonium reprocessed from the fuel rods. In the follow-on tranche, or stage, they will need to provide a declaration. But we don’t want just a declaration that hasn’t been arrived at in an iterative manner – that is, within a process. We hope in this process of discussing the list we can get a clear understanding of what they have --so that when we do get to the declaration, it would be an accurate declaration. I think it’s important also that the DPRK reaffirmed their commitment to the September 19th agreement, which called for complete denuclearization. And of course that would include nuclear weapons.
QUESTION: Did North Korea promise not to conduct the second nuclear test?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You know, a second nuclear test would be so damaging to that process. I think everyone understands the role that the nuclear test would have on our diplomatic process.
QUESTION: At what point of time in this initial agreement would North Korea shut down Yongbyon and let in IAEA inspectors?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes, all of this is to happen within sixty days.
QUESTION: (inaudible)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, all of this is to happen within sixty days. Now what you are suggesting is perhaps that they would take the 50,000 tons of fuel oil and then refuse to shut down the reactor. I don’t think that would happen. And if it does, we will deal with it. But I have many, many things that I worry about, and that’s not one of them.
QUESTION: Can you give us some more idea of how to resolve the BDA issues?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: You know, there have been a lot of discussions in Washington about this in recent weeks. I know that at very senior levels of my government, there have been a lot of discussions about it. From my vantage point as the negotiator of the Six Parties, I can simply assure you as we assure the other six-parties that we will resolve it within the thirty days.
QUESTION: Ambassador Hill, the IAEA inspectors, are they going to be allowed back into all nuclear facilities, or is it just envisioned that they will be allowed into the Yongbyon facility?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Right now, what we are looking at is the shut down and sealing of the Yongbyon site. Of course, as we go deeper into the process, further phases, of course we would need additional international monitoring. But right now, what we are talking about in the set of initial actions, we are talking about the Yongbyon site. I don’t want to get into too many details on that, because obviously that is the IAEA’s work. But [it] also would be the work of the denuclearization working group.
I think I have to get going here before I collapse. Go ahead ask another question.
QUESTION: Are you considering going to visit Pyongyang?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think what we agreed was that the first step to have our working group was that I would invite Mr. Kim to New York. Neutral territory -- no that’s a joke. [Laughter.]
QUESTION: What was North Korea’s final move that enabled the parities to have agreement?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: As I tried to explain earlier, the issue was energy. The issue was they wanted to discuss an overall figure or have an overall figure. And we were prepared to do that, but only insofar as we could identify steps in the next phase. So we worked something out so that we are able to identify what the next phase is going to look like -- and in that way help to make clear that after sixty days we are not going to stop for a couple of years, but rather keep on going with a next phase with some very identified elements in. Obviously, a lot more work has to be done. But I think it’s an effort to point us in the right direction, in return for which the DPRK will get the fuel and economic assistance that they need.
QUESTION: Did the light water reactor come up? Do you have a concern that it’s going to crop up in the second phase?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Not in the phase that I just described. But no, we did not discuss the light water reactor until you brought it up. Thank you.
QUESTION: You said you had plenty of things to worry about. What are they?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, I don’t know -- my plane tickets. There are just a lot of things.
QUESTION: Are you leaving tomorrow morning?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I’m leaving tomorrow morning.
QUESTION: Celebrating tonight?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: I think I am going to do a little more work and at some point, yes, I hope to have a beer and some noodles -- something like that.
QUESTION: Are you coming back again?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, we’ve agreed; yes, I will be back!
QUESTION: We’ll miss you!
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Yes. We’ve agreed we are going to have another Six Party meeting, Monday, March 19th. That’s kind of the date we put down for that. Obviously, we have a lot of work to do on the working groups. We really want keep this going. We don’t want to lose momentum. We don’t want anyone to think that these initial actions are an end in themselves.
The best way we can prove that they are just initial actions is to get on to the next set of actions. I think we’ve got a little momentum here, and I cannot emphasize enough the importance of this multilateral process. We’ve got six really eager beaver delegations. Everyone is working very hard so, let’s see if we can get there.
Hey, I think I’m getting the hook over here, so I’m going have to leave.
QUESTION: Are you being invited to Kim Jong Il’s birthday party?
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: No, no one’s inviting me to anything. So, anyways, it’s great to see you all. And I guess I look forward to—no, I do look forward to seeing you again, and maybe when I come back to here to Beijing.
So, take care. Get some rest.
QUESTION: Congratulations!
ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: OK. Thank you very much! Bye-bye.