Speeches and Transcripts

A PEACE REGIME ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE WAY AHEAD

Alexander Vershbow
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea

Remarks to the IFANS Special Seminar
“Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula: Visions and Tasks”
Seoul - October 26, 2007

Thank you, IFANS Chancellor Lee Ju-heum, for sponsoring this important seminar and for inviting me to participate.  I think it’s an important sign of progress on the North Korean nuclear issue that institutions such as yours are now looking seriously at the substance of a future peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. 

It’s a pleasure to be here with Ambassador Chun Yung-woo.  As you can imagine, I have gotten to know Ambassador Chun quite well.  He is a genuine expert in diplomacy with in-depth knowledge of very complicated issues that the Six Party Talks address, and I believe that his remarks show a strong degree of accord between the views of the U.S. and Korean governments on a peace regime.

I am also honored to share this panel with my colleague, Ambassador Ning Fukui from the People’s Republic of China.

I propose to use my time with you this afternoon to briefly discuss three issues:

• the U.S. government’s longstanding support for rapprochement between the two Koreas; 
• the importance of sustained further progress in the Six-Party Talks to allow for real work on a peace regime; 
• and a word on U.S. views of the wider security environment in Northeast Asia and how the Six Parties can continue to play a role there.

But first, let me cut to the chase and tell you where Washington stands on the issue of peace regime discussions, because recent press reports on our position can be confusing.

First, in the U.S. view, the so-called directly related parties are likely to be four: the two Koreas, China and the United States.  This point was made by President Roh Moo-hyun in a recent statement.  Our Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte also made this point a few days ago in Washington.  Clearly, the most important parties are the two Koreas.  But both China and the U.S. were also involved in the conflict, so it makes sense to have these four parties involved in peace regime discussions.

Regarding when we could start discussions of a peace regime, we believe that first there must be significant progress in North Korean denuclearization.  More specifically, we would favor launching the negotiations after North Korea has disabled its existing nuclear facilities, provided a complete and comprehensive declaration of all of its nuclear programs, and demonstrated that it is on the road to complete denuclearization. 

Regarding the issue of when such a prospective peace agreement can be completed and signed, again the position of the United States is that denuclearization must come first.  That is, as President Bush said in Sydney, there cannot be a signed peace treaty that ends the Korean War until North Korea has completely and verifiably eliminated its nuclear weapons and nuclear programs.  For it makes no sense to have a peace agreement as long as there is a nuclear threat on the Peninsula. 

I think that the U.S. and ROK positions on this issue are well coordinated on both the timing of negotiations on a peace regime and the substance of an eventual peace agreement.  We both are thinking of a broad approach, one that would go beyond the basic legal question of replacing the armistice with a peace treaty formally ending the war and establishing a normal boundary between the two Koreas.   We agree that, in addition to these core commitments, a permanent peace agreement would also include military confidence-building measures that would defuse some of the military tensions that today cut across the DMZ.

There are many other issues that may need to be addressed in the context of a peace regime, as Ambassador Chun suggested, such as:  determining the fate of the UN Command; the question of an implementing mechanism, and whether it would be multilateral or involve only the two Koreas; verification of possible military measures; and a possible dispute resolution mechanism.  Getting the substance right is important if we are going to bring about a real transformation of the status quo into a durable peace regime. 

Let me say a few words about the United States’ support for rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula in the context of our two countries’ strong and successful security alliance over the past 57 years.  When North Korea made a surprise attack across the 38th parallel in June 1950, our two countries and UN partners joined together and fought to preserve South Korea’s freedom.  Since 1953, when South Korea and the United States signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, we have worked together to preserve peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.  This period of relative order and tranquility (albeit with a few trials and tribulations along the way) provided South Korea the opportunity to develop into the political and economic powerhouse that it is today.

Yet the Korean War still has not officially come to an end.  There are still 28,500 dedicated U.S. service members here in South Korea.  Like everyone here today, each one of those service members hopes for peace on the Peninsula.  Nevertheless they remain prepared to help maintain the peace if called upon to do so.  Even as we work toward a permanent peace regime, we should be careful to acknowledge both the strength of our Alliance and the reason why it continues to this day. 

In spite of the continuing North Korean threat, the United States government has consistently supported South-North rapprochement and a peace settlement on the Korean Peninsula.  Many of you no doubt know the detailed history better than I do, but to cite just one example:  in a September 1975 speech to the UN General Assembly, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed a conference among “all countries directly involved” in the Korean Armistice Agreement, the cross-recognition of North and South Korea, and the simultaneous admission of the two Koreas into the United Nations.  The background was that North Korea had consistently rejected the idea of negotiating with South Korea.  Kissinger in effect stood up for South Korea, and subsequent administrations have stuck with that same position, resulting in the Four-Party Talks in 1997 and then the Six-Party Talks starting in 2003.

More generally, the United States has supported the Republic of Korea’s effort – to use President Roh Moo-hyun’s words from this year’s August 15 National Liberation Day speech – to “develop [its] relationship [with North Korea] into one that is predictable and trustworthy.”  The past three decades of inter-Korean history have emphasized establishing a peaceful modus vivendi, and that sensible approach should be encouraged, including through increased economic cooperation.

Even though the United States’ position is that a final peace regime cannot be achieved until North Korea has fully denuclearized, we support work on confidence-building measures and other efforts to lower tensions further.   Perhaps we can discuss confidence-building measures in greater detail this afternoon. 

I think we all share the goal of achieving real peace on the Korean Peninsula, but we should also recognize, and work on, the steps needed to arrive at that end state, even before formal peace negotiations begin.  It would be good to see unambiguous signals from the North that it is ready to work on concrete peace-building steps.  

Now let me move to the state of the Six-Party Talks, focusing on what progress is needed to keep us on the road to peace discussions.

We’ve certainly come a long way in one year.  The February 13 Agreement was a clear statement of obligations to be carried out in phases by the DPRK and the five partner countries as they implement the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement, which remains the overarching agreement for the Six Party process.  The full implementation of Phase One commitments – shutting down the Yongbyon reactor and facilities in exchange for energy assistance – is encouraging.

Now we are focused on the completion of Phase Two.  The DPRK committed in the October 3 Agreement to complete the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities and provide a complete declaration of all of its nuclear programs by the end of the year.  The U.S. experts team that recently traveled to Yongbyon expects to start disablement work in the very near future.  So we are on track; and we need to stay on track and move quickly to the third and final phase, when we expect North Korea to completely abandon its nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. 

For peace regime discussions to move forward, the United States needs to be assured that denuclearization will continue beyond Phase Two; we need to see movement toward complete and verifiable denuclearization by North Korea.  In addition – and this was stated in the October 3 Agreement – the DPRK must not transfer any of its nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.

In parallel with progress on denuclearization, the U.S. has made clear that we will work toward normalization of our relationship with the DPRK.  As you know, we have been meeting with the North Koreans to resolve outstanding bilateral issues.  The last working-level meeting took place earlier this week in New York.  We are also looking to increase non-governmental exchanges with the DPRK and provide humanitarian aid.  In short, we’re serious about improving the bilateral relationship, as called for in the Six Party Talks agreements.

As you have heard Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill say:  “Everything is possible with denuclearization.” 

Finally, let me comment on the wider issue of peace and security in Northeast Asia.  The United States’ strong view is that the Six-Party framework – which has the countries at this table and others working together for the first time – is well worth building on.  As the September 2005 Joint Statement says:  “The Six Parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia.”

Under Russian chairmanship, the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Working Group has already met two times, and is trying to develop a base of common approaches to regional security issues.  Our hope is that the Foreign Ministers of the Six Parties can meet soon to give additional impetus to these discussions, with a view toward establishing a permanent regional mechanism for cooperation on peace and security as the legacy of the Six Party Talks.  That would solidify the working relationships evident at this table.

And it is important to consider what North Korea could gain from this:  to go from being the most isolated, underdeveloped country in Northeast Asia to a full-fledged member of a new international regional arrangement and a participant in the extraordinary progress taking place in this part of the world.  Like denuclearization, this will require that North Korea choose normal relations with its neighbors rather than self-imposed isolation.

Let me conclude by re-emphasizing that we need to work together to build a durable peace structure on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. 

Our position is clear.  As President Bush said in a speech about Asia last November in Singapore, “If North Korea chooses a peaceful path, America and our partners in the Six-Party Talks are prepared to provide security assurances, economic assistance and other benefits to the North Korean people.”

We could say that the Korean Peninsula peace agreement that will finally and officially end the Korean War is like the roof of a new house.  We all want to get to the point where we can build that roof.  But first we need to complete work on the foundation – confidence-building measures and increased openness on the part of North Korea – and the walls – full denuclearization.  The United States is committed to proceeding with this project as far as conditions will allow, and I hope we can all be present at the ribbon-cutting for this new structure.